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ST. LOUIS, APRIL 27, 1883.

THE RIGHT OF A BONA FIDE OCCUPANT OF LAND TO COMPENSATION
FOR HIS IMPROVEMENTS.
It may be observed, in the first place, that
the civil law affo:ded protection to the bona
fide occupant of land, who had made useful
or permanent improvements on the land, believing himself to be the true owner. The
civil law never permitted one who was in the
possession of land in good faith, to be turned
out of his possession by the rightful owner,
without any eompeus$.tion for the additional
value he has given to the soil by the improvements he had made; but it allowed him to offset the value of his improvements to the
extent, at least, of the rents and profits
claimed.'
He was not entitled to compensation for all his expenditures upon the estate,
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2
but only for such as had enhanced its value.
This principle, too, was adopted into the law
of those modern nations whose jurisprudence
was derived from the Roman law: into that of
5
France, 3 and Spain, 4 and Scotland.
rule was
the
At the common law, however,
averse
was
law
that
of
policy
different. The
to making any allowance to the bena fide occupant of land for the improvements he might
have made upon the land; and this was upon
the theory that the true owner was under no
legal or moral obligation to pay for improvements which he had never authorized to be
made, and which originated in wrongful ocAccordingly, the improvements
cupancy.
were considered as annexed to the freehold,
and as passing with it. Consequently, when
the owner recovered in ejectment, he was not
subjected to the condition of paying for any
improvements which might have been made
upon the land by the occupant. And it was
immaterial that the occupant was in possession in good faith, under color of title, beieving himself to have the title to the land.
As against the true owner, he was an intruder, a wrong-doer, who was not entitled to
any compensation whatever for his improvements, which passed with the land to the owner upon a recovery in ejectment. 6
It was well settled, however, that in case
the true owner of an estate, after a recovery
thereof at law from a bona fide purchaser for
a valuable consideration without notice,
sought an account in equity, as plaintiff,

2 Dig., lib. 20, tit. 1, 1.29, sec. 2; Dig., lib. 6, tit.
1, I. 65; Id., I. 38. See 2 Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 1237;
Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige's Ch. (N. Y.) 890, 403,
404; Bright v. Boyd, I Story (U. S.), 478.
3 Code Napoleon, arts. 552, 556; Pothierde la Pro-

priete, n. 348, 358.
4 Asa & Manuel's Inst. of Laws of Spain, 9102.
513el1's Com. on Law of Scotland, p. 13 , sec. 538;
Ersl;. Inst., 1). 3, tit. 1, see. 11.
6 Iteed v. Reed, 68 Me. 568; Clark v. Hornthal, 47
Miss. 434, 476; Blanchard v. Ware, 43 Iowa, 580; Newland v. Baker, 26 Kan. 341, 344; Barton v. Land Co.,
27 Kan. 634, 687; Pugh v. Bell, 2 Mon. (Ky.) 129; Clausen v. Rayburn, 14 Iowa, 136, 140; Webster v. StewAvt, 6 Iowa, 401; Lunqueet v. Ten Evek, 40 Iowa, 213;
McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio St. 463, 466; Wilsm v. Red
Wing School District, 22 Minn. 488, 491; McMinn v.
Mayes, 4 Cal. 209; Ford v. Holton, 5 Cal. 819; Chesroumild v. Cunningham, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 82, 84; Westerfield v. Williams, 59 Ind. 221, 224; Graham v.
Connersville, etc. R. Co., 36 Ind. 463, 470; Rainer v.
Huddleston, 51 Tenn. 223, 225; Townsend v. Shipp,
Cooe (Tenn.), 294; Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.)
360; Bonner v. Wiggins, 52 Tex. 125; Russell v. Blake,
2 Pick. (Mass.) 507.

against such possessor, for the rents and
profits, the possessor so sued might recoup
from the rents and profits the full amount of
all the meliorations and improvements which
he had beneficially made upon the estate. So,
where one held merely the equitable title, and
sought the aid of the equity court to enforce
it, it was settled that the court would administer that aid only upon the terms of makifig
compensation to such bona fide possessor for
the amount of his meliorations and improvements.7 But an entirely different question
was presented when the bona fide purchaser
himself came into equity asking for affirmative
relief against the true owner, after he had recovered the premises at law. The right to
grant such affirmative, relief was considered
by Chancellor Walworth in the New York
Court of Chancery in 1837. It was disposed
of as follows: "I have not, however, been
able to find any case, either in this country
or in England, wherein the court of chancery
has assumed jurisdiction to give relief to a
complainant, who has made improvements
upon land, the legal title to which was in the
defendant, where there has been neither fraud
nor acquiescence on the part of the latter after
he had knowledge of his legal rights. I do
not, therefore, feel myself authorized to introduce a new principle into the law of this
court, without the sanction of the legislature,
which principle in its application to future
cases might be productive of more Injury
than benefit. If it is desirable that such a
principle should be introduced into the law
of this State, for the purpose of giving the
bona fide possessor a lien upon the legal title
for the beneficial improvements he has made,
it would probably be much better to give him
a remedy by action at law, where both parties
could have the benefit of a trial by jury, than
to embarrass the title to real estate with the
expense and delay of a protracted chancery
suit in all such cases." 8
Four years afterwards the question again
came up, and this time in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the first circuit, Mr.
Justice Story presiding. After alluding to
the opinion of Chancellor Walworth, and to
his admission that he could find no case in
England or America where the point had been
decided either way, Mr. Justice Story said
7 See

2 Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 799, a, 1b.

8 Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige's Ch. 405.
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"-4ow,
if there be no authority against the

doctrine, I confess that I should be most reluctant to be the first judge to lead to such a
decision. It appears to me, speaking with
all deference to other opinions, that the denial of all compensation to such a bona fide
purchaser in such a case, where he has manifestly added to the permanent value of an
estate by his meliorations and improvements
without the slightest suspicion of any infirmity in his own title, is contrary to the first
principles of equity." And after a careful
consideration of the subject, he laid down
the broad doctrine that so far as an innocent
purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of any infirmity in his title, had,
by his improvements and meliorations, added
to the permanent value of the estate, he was
entitled to a full remuneration, and that such
increase of value was a lien and charge on
the estate, which the absolute owner was
bound to discharge before he could be restored-to his original rights in the land. 9 On
the coming in of the Master's report, two
years -afterwards, this conclusion was adhered
to. "It has," said Mr. Justice Story, "the
most persuasive equity, and, I may add, common sense and common justice for its foundation."' 10 The cases of Henry v. Polland, n
and Matthews v. Davis, 12 decided in Tennessee, soqn followed, and were to the same effect, being based on Judge Story's decision,
and i was announced that affirmative relief
would be granted to one who went into possession under a parol contract of sale, and
made improvements on the land prior to eviction by the vendor. There are cases to the
same effect in North Carolina. 13
This opinion of Mr. Justice Story has
been recognized and adopted elsewhere,i4
but has rarely had occasion to be reviewed in
this country, owing to statutory regulation
of the question, and the opinion has been ex-.
v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478.
102 Story, 607.
114 Humph. (Tenn.) 362.
12 6 Bumph. (Tenn.) 324.
3Allbea v. Griffin, 2 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) Eq. 9;
Wetherell v. Gorman, 74 N. C. 603; Hill v. Brower,
76 N. C. 124; Smith v. Stewart, 83 N.. C. 406; Wharton v. MIoore, 84 N. C. 479, 483.
&11 Hatcher v. Briggs, 6 Oregon 31; Union Hall v.
Morrison, 39 Md. 281; Thomas v. Thomas, Fx'r., 16
B. Monr. (Ky.) 421; Bell's Heirs v. Barnett, 2 S.S.
Mar. (Ky.) 516; Valle's Heirs v. Fleming's Heirs, 29
Mo. 152. '
9 Bright
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pressed in a recent case, that in consequence
it is difficult to say whether or not it can be
regarded as the established law. 15 It can not
be denied that where one has gone into the
possession. of land in good faith, believing
himself to be the owner, and has expended
money in making permanent improvements
which have increased the value of the property, he has a strong natural equity, growing out of his own mistake and the neglect of
the true owner, which would seem to entitle
him to remuneration to the extent that his
improvements have augmented the value of
the land. Inrecognition of this equity, many
of the States have adopted what are'known
as betterment or occupying claimant's acts.
These statutes generally provide that after
recovery in ejectment, the defendant, being a
bona fide occupant, shall be entitled to recover of the plaintiff the full value of the
improvements made upon the land, which
value is to be assessed by a jury, or by commissioners, and to the extent that it is in excess of the mesne profits, is made a lien on
the land, the payment of which constitutes a
condition precedent to a recovery of the possession. The Plaintiff has the option of taking possession, by paying the -lien, or of receiving in lieu of the land, the sum which may
be ascertained to be equitably due him. The
constitutionality of these acts has been sustained in a number of decisions, which seem
to effectually preclude any further doubt of
their legality.' 6
In sustaining the constitutionality of one
of these statutes, the court of Vermont so
well explained the principle of betterment
laws in general, that its repetition, in this
connection, is of interest. "The action for
betterments, as they are now termed in the
statute, is given on the supposition that the
legal title is found to be in the plaintiff in
ejectment, and is intended to secure to the de15Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Conn. 577, 581.
16Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Conn. 577; Ross v. Irving,
14 111. 171; Claypoole v. King, 21 Kans. 602, 612; Scott
v. Mather, 14 Texas 235; Burke v. Mechanics' Savings
Bank, 12 R.I. 513, 515; Whitney v. Richardson, 31
Vt. 306; Pacquett v. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219; Saunders
v. Wilson,19 Texas 194- Hunt's Lessee v. McMahan. 5
Ohio 132; Longworth v. Wolfington, 6 Ohio 10; Fowler v. Halbert, 4 Bibb. (Ky.) 64; Wilson v. Red Wing
School District, 22 Minn. 488; Childs v. Shower, 18
Iowa 261; Lessee of Davis v. Poweil,13 Ohio 808; Bodley
v. Galther, 3 Mon. (Ky.) 58; Armstrong v. Jackson, 1
Blackf. (Ind.) 374; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303.
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fendant the fruit of his labor, and to the
plaintiff all that he is justly entitled to, which
is his land in as good a situation as it would
have been had no labor been bestowed
thereon. The statute is highly equitable in all
its provisions, and would do exact justice, if
the value either of the improvements or of the
land was always correctly estimated. The
principles upon which it is founded are taken
from the civil law, where ample provision was
made for reimbursing the bona fide possessor
the expense of his improvements if he was
removed from his possession by the legal
owner. It gives to the possessor, not the expense which he has laid out on the land, but
the amount which he has increased the value of
the land by his betterment thereon; or, in
other words, the difference between the value
of the land as it is when the owner recovers
it and the value if no improvement had been
made. If the owner takes the land, together
with the improvements, at the advanced value
which it has from the labor of the possessor,
what can be more just than that he should pay
the difference? But if he is unwilling to pay
this difference, by giving a deed as the statute
provides, he receives the value as it would
have been if nothing had been done thereon.
The only objection which can be made is,
that it is sometimes compelling the owner to
sell when he he may have been content with
the property in its natural state. But this,
when weighed against the loss to the bona fide
possessor, and against the injustice of depriving him of the fruits of his labor, and giving
it to another, who, by his negligence in
not sooner enforcing his claim, has in some
measure contributed to the mistake under
which he has labored, is not entitled to very
great consideration."' 17 Such laws may be
unconstitutional, however, by reason of some
special and unusual provision, by means of
which private rights of property are violated,
and the limitations of legislative power are
not duly observed. For instance, a provision
in such a law requiring repayment to the occupant of the purchase money paid by him
for the land, with interest on the same, can
not possibly be sustained. It is impossible to
support it on the ground upon which reimbursement for improvements rests.18
17 Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt. 37. See too, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 485, where this passage is also
given.
Is Madland v. Benland, 24Minn. 372.

So where the statute confers on the occupying claimant the option, after recovery of
the judgment against him for the land, to demand payment from the successful claimant
of the full value of his permanent improvements, or to pay to the successful claimant
the value of the land without the improvements, and retain it. Such an option may be
granted to the successful claimant, but can
not be upheld when conferred on the occupying claimant, 19 and iu no case can the legislature constitutionally make the value of the
improvements a personal charge against the
owner of the land and authorize a personal
20
judgment against him.
It is doubtful whether a betterment act,
such as we have been considering, can constitutionally be made to apply to improvements
made before its passage. If such improvements by the common law belong to the
owner of the soil at the time they are made,
his rights thereto would seem to be such a
vested right of property as falls within the
protection afforded by the constitution. In
Society, etc. v. -Wheeler, 21 Mr. Justice Story
held that such a law could not constitutionally be made applicable to improvements
made before its passage. Mr. Justice Cooley,
on the other hand, in his Constitutional
deLimitations, 22 points out that -this
cision was made under the New Hampshire constitution, which forbade retrospective laws, and adds: "The principles of
equity, upon which such legislation is sustained,would seem not to depend upon the time
23
But
when the improvements were made.
24
in Burke v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, the
above passage from Mr. Justice Cooley's
Limitations is quoted, aid the court says:
"We can not assent to the reasoning. Morally, it may be as wrong for the owner of the
land to become the owner of the improvements before as after the law; but before the
law it is legally his right to become its owner,
and therefore to make him pay for it by re19 McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio St. 463, 467; Childs v.
Shower, 18 Iowa 261.
20 Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa 261. " Such a law is
unprecedented. It has neither reason, necessity, nor
precedent to support it. It tramples under foot the
constitutional rights of property and of the citizen."

Per Dillon, J.

21 2 Gall. (U. S.) 105.
22 p. 486 (4th ed).
23See Davis v. Powell, 13 Ohio 308.
24 12 R. I. 513, 515.
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trospective legislation is to make him pay another for his own property, and thus in effect
to deprive him of his own property without
due process of law."
It is to be noted in conclusion, that an
Indian owner of lands, holding the same under a treaty with the government of the
United States, in regard to Indian lands within
the State, can not be compelled to pay for improvements in accordance with the provisions5
2
of a betterment act enacted by the State.
And this is upon the principle that where
there is a conflict between the law of the State
and a treaty of the United States, the former
must give way. But this immunity of the
Indian owner is adjudged to be a personal
privilege, and the grantee of such owner succeeds only to the title to the land, and is regarded as having no better right to improvethan
ments made by an occupying claimant 26
any other owner of the land would have.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
2D Maynes v. Veale, 20 Kans. 874.

26 Krause v. Means, 12 Kans. 335.
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